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Comments received by DEPT on UK plan for European security have been extremely helpful. On April 18 DEPT gave British Embassy seven-page memorandum of detailed comment on plan, copies of which being pouched. These comments were cleared with Defense. Summary follows:

1) We believe disengagement on basis of division of Germany would increase rather than diminish risks of conflict in Europe. We see no evidence present deployment forces has given rise to significant danger of war. Acceptance of idea of disengagement as negotiable issue would risk piecemeal dismantling of present defense position. Disengagement as part of negotiated settlement involving German reunification is different matter.

2) UK proposals would involve break in close link between European security and German reunification with possibly serious long-term effects on our relations with Germany. Moreover UK proposal appears to abandon Geneva Directive.

3) Principal

Drafted by:

EUR:GER:JJReinstein/ea/fjb 4/21/58

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by

EUR - Foy D. Kohler

Clearances: RA - Mr. McBride (in draft)

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3) Principal danger point in Europe is Berlin. Although we are doubtful anything can be done, we would be interested in exploring possibility of stabilizing Berlin situation.

4) Complete denuclearization of Germany and complete demilitarization of East Zone involve concepts which oversimplify problems. We question whether banning of all nuclear weapons in Germany could be envisaged in absence of broader disarmament arrangements which would provide substantial measure of security. It would not be acceptable for US forces to be deprived of nuclear capability and UK proposals might result in US withdrawal from Europe.

5) Our immediate requirement is to produce proposals which indicate we are prepared to engage in genuine negotiation and to maintain unity of the Alliance. We believe that, without departing radically from 1955 proposals, we can develop position which will meet these requirements and command broad support within Alliance as whole.

Hertner
ACTING

(FDK)

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